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CHINA'S FOREIGN AID IN 1979-80* 
By John Franklin Copper 
Introduction 
The most salient change in China's foreign aid progr&m during 
1979-80 was the fart that China became a net capital borrower, but 
continued its foreign aid giving in that context. In fact, China became 
a major recipient of grants and loans during the period, having 
established a policy of obtaining development funds from almost any 
source and in almost unlimited amounts. According to the Vice-
Chairman of the State Planning Commission, China was preparing to 
borrow as much as $20 billion by 1985.1 
China's entrance into the game of soliciting aid even evoked 
some concern from other developing countries that China may cause 
less funds to be available to other nations, especially from interna-
tional lending institutions where China is able to borrow in 
proportion to its population.2 This concern prompted the World Bank 
to try to dispel rumors to the eEect that China, as a new borrower 
and based upon its large population and low per capita income, was 
entitled to as much as $1 billion of the $12 billion the W.:>rld Bank 
has available for the poorest nations.3 
Japan and the U.S. were the largest suppliers of capital to China, 
most of which was granted in the form of low interest loans and 
deferred credits. Since the interest on the loans was below the rate of 
inflation and some of the deferred payments were without interest, 
the grant factor on these transactions was considerable. The same 
was true of a host of loans China received from international lending 
institutions. China even obtained credit from some smaller countries 
- - ~ -
* For assessments of China's foreign aid before 1979, see the following works by 
the author: CHINA'S FOREIGN AID: AN INSTRUMENT OF PEKING'S FOREIGN 
POLICY (Le:r.:ington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1976); "China's Foreign Aid in 1976," 
Current Scene, Vol. XV, Nos. 6 and 7, June-July 1977; "China's Foreign Aid in 1977," 
Current Scene, Vol. XVI, Nos. 8 and 9, August-September 1978; and "China's Foreign 
Aid in 1978," Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 
University of Maryland Law School, No. 8, 1979. 
1. Times (London), February 8, 1980, p. 3. 
2. India, among other nations, expressed this concern. See Financial Times 
(London), November 13, 1980, p. 4. 
3. Washington Post, June 28, 1980, p. 11. It is worth noting in this context that 
China claimed $230 as its annual per capita income, while the World Bank estimate 
was $460. Acceptance of the former figure would give China an additional advantage 
in borrowing from this institution. 
(1) 
2 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
and some nations that are not considered rich nations, such as 
Australia and Argentina.4 
Because of the emphasis put upon domestic economic develop-
ment, much less was said about economic assistance to other 
countries by Chinese leaders or by the media in China. Thus, while 
China has always been reluctant to announce its aid promises for a 
variety of reasom;, including the fact that it wants to avoid 
comparisons with aid given by the richer countries and maintain the 
image of giving aid without strings attached, it has recently become 
even more reticent in providing details about its aid giving. Hence 
officially announced bilateral aid in 1979 and 1980 was down from 
previous years. (See Table 1). In 1979 China provided between $99 
and $112 million in aid to other countries that it or the recipient 
country provided figures on, and this included only two nations. (See 
Table 2). In 1980 the figure was smaller, or a total of $89.5 million in 
official aid, with four recipients. (See Table 3). And in the case of only 
one of the recipients during this two year period was the announce-
ment made in China - an interest free loan to Zimbabwe. 
On the other hand, Beijing made public most of its RP.d Cross and 
other emergency aid, which exceeded previous years, and, if added to 
China's official aid giving, would bring the total of officially 
announced aid up slightly. Funds China provided to U.N.-affiliated 
and other international organizations were considerably larger than 
emergency aid, especially in 1980, and, if added to China's aid 
program, would increase the total figure noticeably. Finally, if the 
costs borne by China for resettling ethnic Chinese among the 
Indo-Chinese refugees is counted, China's aid program increases by 
several fold. Further details on these points are provided in 
subsequent pages. 
----~n- past years, official aid figures tell very little about China's 
foreign aid program and during 1979-80 this remained true. Most of 
China's aid giving was unannounced and its real aid exceeded by 
several fold the amount that can be documented in terms of values 
and conditions or terms. On the other hand, like its official aid 
giving, China's real aid also declined appreciably. Two factors explain 
this drop: (1) the termination of aid to Vietnam and Albania - the 
, 4. In June 1980 Argentina extended China credits totalling $300 million to buy 
non-traditional goods. The rate of interest was 7V2 percent for capital goods and 31/2 
percent for durable and semi-durable goods, and the repayment period was 81/2 and 10 
years respectively. For further details see New China News Agency (hereinafter 
NCNA), June 7, 1980 cited in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (hereinafter 
FBIS), June 9, 1980, p. 13. 
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two largest recipients of Chinese aid in the late 1960s and early 
1970s - in 1978, and; (2) the greater concern over domestic economic 
development and the fact that Chinese leaders perceived that they 
could better use the funds at home. There may also have been some 
apprehension over public opinion vis-a-vis China's aid giving in view 
of the fact that much publicity was being given to domestic economic 
growth and because China is a poor country.5 
Hostile relations with Vietnam and Albania account for the fact 
that in terms of regions or blocs, China's aid giving during 1979-80 
reflected a major shift in direction. Very little aid was given during 
the period to communist bloc countries. In fact, North Korea was 
probably the only real recipient of Chinese foreign aid and there is 
real doubt whether this aid was very significant. Pyongyang obtained 
petroleum from China at "friendly prices" and China reported that a 
chemical plant and an oil pump and nozzle plant built with Chinese 
aid went into operation in North Korea in 1980.6 Suggesting that this 
aid was not very important, Pyongyang reported that it was receiving 
much more aid from the Soviet Union and was "dissatisfied" with 
China's aid.7 
In addition to these donations China announced a one time grant 
of emergency assistance to Yugoslavia.8 Beijing also claimed to have 
finished a hospital in Afghanistan after the installation of the 
pro-Soviet communist regime there; and it reported giving food, 
medicine and other aid to Vietnamese citizens in occupied areas in 
Vietnam during the war between the two countries in early 1979.9 
These latter donations, however, cannot be regarded as genuine 
foreign aid because they are too small and used only one time grants, 
and because they cannot be confirmed. 
Whereas China's aid to communist nations declined, its aid to 
insurgent groups increased over previous years - even compared 
5. See John F. Copper, "China's Foreign aid in 1978," Occasional Papers/Reprint, 
Services in Contemporary Asian Studies, School of Law, University of Marjlaud 
November 8, 1979 (No. 29). 
6. For details on oil deliveries, which increased from 700,000 tons in 1979 to 2 
million tons in 1980, resulting from the completion of oil refinery in North Korea near 
the Chinese border (possibly with some Chinese assistance), see Asia 1981 Yearbook 
(Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, Ltd., 1981), p. 173. The aid projects are 
mentioned by Beijing Radio, cited in Young C. Kim, "North Korea in 1980: The Son 
Also Rises," Asian Survey 21 (1981): 122, and NCNA, August 13, 1980, cited in China 
Aktuell, August 1980, p. 7. 
7. Kim, "North Korea in 1980," p. 123. 
8. NCNA, November 9, 1980, cited in FBIS, November 12, 1980, p. A3. 
9. NCNA, October 13, 1980, cited in FBIS, October 15, 1980, p. 13. 
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with the 1960s, when China claimed as a major tenet of its foreign 
policy support of "wars of national liberation." The surprising or at 
least interesting thingJ about this aid was that it was almost 
exclusively aimed at countering communist regimes. The situation in 
Indochina, where China perceived that Vietnam had become a 
hegemonist power working in conjunction with the Soviet Union, the 
Kremlin's invasion of Afghanistan and the threat that posed to South 
Asia and the Middle East, and China's continued dispute with the 
Soviet Union all explain the change in China's aid giving. 
China's military aid also shows an increase over previous years . 
. Pakistan was the major recipient, receiving increased amounts of 
arms from China in response to the Soviet Union's invasion of 
Mghanistan: Egypt also received significant quantities of arms from 
China during the period .. Several other countries recieved lesser 
amounts of weapons aid. 
In terms of the total number of recipient nations, China's aid 
giving was down slightly during 1979-80. In 1979 China render~d 
assistance of some type that could be documented to 41 nations (See 
Table 4) and in 1980 to 40 nations. (See Table 5). This compares to 53 
recipients in 1978 and 49 in 1977. The lesser number of recipients 
could well be explained by the fact that China is now saying less 
about its aid and many smaller projects may have gone unreported by 
either China or the recipient nation. In addition, new recipients get 
more attention and say more about aid when it is obtained for the 
first time: there were no new nations added to China's list of aid 
recipients during the period. Yet another factor is the change in 
attitude by Western nations that no longer see China's aid activities 
as a threat or an effort to foster anti-imperialist "wars of national 
liberation." Finally, there is considerable evidence that in the context 
of its own concern about economic development China was simply 
less willing to extend aid to other countries even when this involved 
only small expenditures. 
Medical and agricultural aid remained popula:r, although they 
formed the mainstay of China's foreign assistance program only in 
Mrica. Roads and water and electricity projects also remained 
popular kinds of aid in African, Middle Eastern, as well as some 
Asian countries. While the strategic value of roads is important as 
perceived by the Chinese leaders, Beijing still regards a physical 
presence of its workers, technicians and advisors in foreign countries 
which road work provides more crucial. On the other hand, both 
medical and agricultural aid as well as project aid in general afforded 
this presence during 1979-80 more than road construction. 
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Building construction also remained a popular part of China's aid 
effort, and because of it China's aid giving also took on a new slant. 
In some countries where China has constructed buildings in the past 
as part of its eononomic aid program, it is now signing contracts for 
payment. Most noteworthy are several projects in North Yemen, 
including an agreement with that government on establishing a joint 
building-engineering corporation. China also signed an agreement 
establishing a joint venture furniture construction project with North 
Yemen, and an agreement with the government of Iraq to build 
several bridges, including one large bridge over the Tigrus River for 
payment.'0 
According to a Chinese source, Beijing has signed more than 
forty construction contracts abroad, mostly with Middle Eastern 
countries.11 
Beijing also reported that the China Construction Corporation, 
which is the major builder overseas, employs more than 80,000 
architects and workers and has experience in more than fifty 
countries.'2 One may conclude from this that China has in at least 
one respect profited from its foreign aid program and may in the 
future be expected to utilize more if its expertise gained from foreign 
aid projects to make profits and attain needed foreign exchange. 
This is not, however, to say that China's foreign aid program is 
not generous or not as generous as it was in the past. Most of China's 
aid continues to be given in the form of low or non-interes~ bearing 
loans, or in the form of gifts. It is also generous considering China 
itself is a poor country. On the other hand, as 'in the past, since 
Chinese aid is seldom given in foreign currencies and is almost 
always tied to Chinese products, there is o~ly limited choice in terms 
of goods or supplies for the recipient when compared to most Western 
aid programs. Also, repayment continues to be in goods rather than 
in currency - which in the case of Western economic assistance 
programs is affected by inflation to the advantage of the recipient; 
this drastically limits the grant factor of Chinese aid. 
During the period under survey China rendered more emergency 
assistance than has been the practice in the past. In 1979 the total to 
six recipients was close to one-half million dollars. (See Table 6). In 
1980 it totalled more than a million dollars to six recipients. (See 
Table 7). The explanation for this may be that emergency aid 
provides Iflore publicity and good will for the amount of the donation, 
10. NCNA, May 27, 1980, cited in FBIS, May 29, 1980, p. Al. 
11. NCNA, May 22, 1980, cited in FBIS, May 27, 1980 p. 13. 
12. Ibid. 
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while it is considered humanitarian and is less likely to be questioned 
by China's population or opponents of Deng Xiaoping's economic 
modernization program - who can point out the contradiction 
between the almost singular aim of economic growth and even having 
a foreign airl program. 
In this connection China set a precedent in giving financial 
assistance to the United Nations and several U.N.-affiliated or other 
international organizations. While Beijing had given aid funds to the 
U.N. in the past, it was for the purpose of transferring funds to a 
specific country where China had no direct contacts or where the 
international body could do it more effectively. 13 During 1980, China 
donated a total of over $4.75 million to a number of U.N.-affiliate 
organizations, and other international bodies. (See Table 8). Again 
this seems to reflect an effort by Chinese leaders to gain more 
publicity for the aid they give and to disguise it from their own 
population to avoid possible political opposition. It may also reflect an 
effort to gain a bigger voice in the United Nations and to continue to 
make a bid for leadership of the Third World nations, while China's 
trade increases with the developed Western nations and while China 
competes with Third World Countries for loans from the developed 
countries and international lending agencies. Some of the donations 
also reflect an effort by Chinese leaders to draw global attention to 
the refugee problems spawned by the Vietnamese invasion of 
Kampuchea and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both of which 
Chinese leaders have strongiy criticized. In any event, the reader 
must keep in mind that the amount of aid China has given to the 
U.N. and other international organizations does not approach the 
amount it has received from international lending institutions. 
Related to the aid China provided to the U.N. during the period 
under study and its motives behind this aid, is the fact that China 
has accepted a sizeable number of refugees from Indochina during the 
last two to three years. Although most were ethnically Chinese who 
did not have citizenship locally, Beijing sought to underscore the fact 
that Vietnam was the cause of the refugee problem which created 
severe financial hardship for China. In mid-1980, a Chinese repre-
sentative at the United Nations declared that up to that date China 
had already accepted 260,000 Indochinese refugees and that the 
Chinese government had paid $580 million for their relief and 
13. In 1978 China provided economic aid to Laos through the U.N. This was done 
for convenience reasons. For further details, see Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1978," 
supra note 5, at 5. 
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resettlement.14 One reason for giving attention to the issue and 
China's costs relates both to good publicity for China and a bad image 
for Vietnam as well as an effort to enlist aid from the U.N. and other 
global organizations for refugee costs - which China succeeded in 
doing, though by the end of 1980 to-date only in part. 
In the following sections China's aid to insurgency movements 
and its aid to three geographic/political regions - non-Communist 
Asia, Africa and other areas - are discussed in greater detail. Here 
some of the special facets of China's aid program as well as Beijing's 
strategic views and concerns become evident. 
Aid to Insurgency or Guerrilla Groups 
In terms of its costs China probably rendered as much aid to 
insurgency groups as to nations in any of the geographic/political 
regions to be discussed below. On the other hand, the value and even 
the results or the usefulness of this aid is extremely difficult to 
assess. A good portion of this aid consisted of weapons, though 
equipment, medicine, food and even military advisors and training 
were also provided. In at least one case it was reported that China 
was paying salaries for what amounted to mercenary soldiers. 
All of the insurgency forces or liberation groups to receive 
Chinese assistance were in South or Southeast Asia or Africa. (See 
Tables 9 and 10). Chinese aid was given in both large and small 
amounts and to groups with varying purposes, though it is notewor-
thy that most of China's aid in this category was aimed at countering 
Soviet supported, or Soviet protege governments. The rest was aimed 
at supporting black Africa, though in terms of amounts this was 
much less. Virtually none was aimed at overthrowing pro-Western 
regimes or colonial powers. 
The area where China provided the most extensive support to 
rebel forces was in Indochina: Kampuchea and Laos. China's purpose 
was to threaten and attempt to overthrow the governments of these 
two countries, which are communist but are in the Soviet-Vietnamese 
camp. The significant quantity of aid that China purveyed to 
opposition forces in these two countries must be explained in 
strategic terms: China feels threatened by the Soviet military 
buildup in Asia and sees the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance and these 
two nations' growing influence in the region as an effort to contain 
China as well as deny Beijing a sphere of influence. 
14. NCNA, May 26, 1980, cited in FBIS, May 27, 1980, p. 13. 
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Elsewhere in the region China terminated or cut back its support 
to rebel forces and promised leaders of several non-communist 
Southeast Asian countries that it would not render assistance to 
communist insurgency movements there. 15 Confirming these state-
ments in mid-1979, China specifically stated - ~nd there was no 
contradictory evidence - that it was no longer providing aid to 
communist movements in Thailand or Malaysia. 16 At about the same 
time, Beijing cut its aid drastically to the Burmese Communist Party, 
which China has long supported; as of mid-1980 its aid included only 
certain supplies and no weapons. 17 Chinese leaders apparently 
wanted to concentrate their efforts on countering the Soviet-
Vietnamese threat and sought to ally with local governments to do 
this. More specifically, Chinese aid to Pol Pot's forces in Kampuchea 
and its cutting of assistance to communist insurgency movements in 
Thailand and Malaysia seemed to be aimed at preventing the 
Vietnamese-supported Heng Samrin government from winning di-
plomatic recognition from countries in the region. In short, China 
wanted to foster doubt concerning the government's control of the 
country. 
The second area of importance where China aided an insurgency 
movement was in South Asia, namely Afghanistan. Much of China's 
help, however, was given to Pakistan in the form of direct military 
assistance. China's aid to Muslim rebels in Afghanistan was not very 
significant in terms of its amount, value, or effect. The only other 
area where China was actively supporting insurgency movements or 
helping wars of national liberation during 1979-80 was in Africa 
where China provided help to forces led by Robert Mugabe that 
sought to overthrow the government of Rhodesia (early during the 
period) and to the Southwest African People's Organization (SW APO) 
which was engaged in guerrilla warfare against South Africa. 
The most extensive aid given to any insurgency or revolutionary 
force during the period went to Pol Pot's forces operating in Western 
Kampuchea and eastern Thailand against the Vietnamese-backed 
Heng Samrin government and Vietnamese troops stationed in the 
country. Early in 1979 Thai sources reported that China had fortified 
15. Derek Davies, "Shadow of the Kremlin," Far Eastern Eonomic Review, August 
24, 1979, p. 21. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Ibid; John McBeth, "New Force in The Opium Trade," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, July 25, 1980, p. 28. The latter notes that the Burmese Communist Party has 
been forced to get into the opium selling business because China withdrew its annual 
grant of $7.48 million. 
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and manned the island of Khemera Phumin off the coast of 
Kampuchea, which was a transit point for Chinese weapons and 
supplies going to Khmer Rouge forces. 18 According to Prince Siha-
nouk, Deng Xiaoping told him that China was also sending arms and 
supplies to Pol Pot's forces through Thailand - with the permission 
of the Thai government - though Bangkok denied this. 19 Significant 
Chinese aid deliveries to the Khmer Rouge were confirmed by 
Vietnamese, Soviet and various Western sources. According to a 
Vietnamese source the amount of Chinese aid going to Pol Pot was 
"huge"; moreover, it included military advisors- some of whom were 
captured by the Vietnamese, including a general.Z0 
During 1980 China also donated money and supplies to U.N. and 
other international organizations to aid Kampuchean refugees, 
apparently for the purpose of sustaining Pol Pot's forces, or to involve 
global institutions in the conflict. In any cas~, Vietnam and the Heng 
Samrin government complained about international aid efforts, 
which they said augmented Pol Pot's strength. Vietnam lent 
confirmation to the effectiveness of this aid, and to the contention 
that Chinese aid was being sent through Thailand, when in June 
Vietnamese forces crossed the Thai border, after which Phnom Penh 
described the incursion as a "self-defense effort" intended to protect 
the sovereignty of Kampuchea.2' At nearly the same time well-
supplied and well-equipped Khmer Rouge troops attacked a train in 
central Kampuchea, killing 200 Vietnamese troops and civilians, 
thereby demonstrating their ability to operate throughout much of 
the country in strength. 22 
According to one source, by late 1980 China had armed from 10 
to 15 thousand Khmer guerrillas in Kampuchea (of a total force of 30 
thousand), both by planting arms and supplies there before the 
Vietnamese invasion in early 1979 and through aid deliveries since.23 
18. The Bangkok Post, February 1, 1979, cited in "Quarterly Chronicle and 
Documentation," Tr.e China Quarterly, 78 (1979): 420. Another source cites Mu lsland 
off Koh King as a transfer point of Chinese weapons and supplies. See Kessings 
Contemporary Archives 25 (1979): 29619. Still another source says Chinese supplies 
were off loaded from a large ship off the southwest coast of Kampuchea possibly in Thai 
waters, into small boats. The Guardian, March 2, 1979 cited in Kessing's Contemporary 
Archives 25 (1979); 29619. 
19. U.S. News and World Report, February 17, 1979, p. 39. 
20. Kessing's Contemporary Archieves, 25 (1979): 29615. 
21. Michael Leifer, "Kampuchea in 1980: The Politics of Attrition," Asian Survey, 
21 (1981): p. 94. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Asia Yearbook 1981, p. 168. 
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During 1979-1980 indications were that China was having no 
difficulty sending arms and equipment to Khmer forces and was even 
able to deliver arms through Laos.24 
On the other hand, while Vietnamese forces were not able to 
pacify all of the country and were unsuccessful in their efforts to cut 
off and contain the Khmer Rouge, neither were Pol Pot's forces able 
to launch a major offensive. Meanwhile, Vietnamese troops were 
provided with fresh weapons and supplies direct from the Soviet 
Union via Kampuchea's southern ports.25 
Thus, one of China's biggest aid operations during the period 
under study must be termed as inconclusive. Beijing was able 
through its aid efforts to sustain Pol Pot's forces and prevent the total 
consolidation of Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces. In this way China 
probably precluded the pro-Vietnam government in Kampuchea 
becoming legitimate and recognized. Also, through its aid to Pol Pot 
China cost Vietnam and the Soviet Union much larger amounts of 
money to support the other side. 1' This, followed by the Chinese 
invasion of Vietnam in early 1979, which caused inestimatable 
damage, has engendered serious economic concern in Vietnam.27 
During 1979, because of an increased Vietnamese and Soviet 
presence in Laos and virtual control over the Laotian government by 
those two countries (especially through the presence of an estimated 
40,000 Vietnamese soldiers in Laos), relations between Laos and 
China turned sour. In this context it was reported that China had 
"mobilized" - vis. armed, equipped and trained - large numbers of 
Hmong (Meo) and Lu minority people in Laos to fight guerrilla war 
in the northern part of the country and was even paying some of 
them a salary of around $30 per month.28 China's efforts were 
24. National Review, April 13, 1979, p. 466. 
25. Asia Yearbook 1981, p. 168. 
26. One source put direct Soviet aid to Vietnam at $2 million per day. See Justus 
M. van der Kroef, "From Phnom Penh to Kabul: The Soviets New Asian Gambit," 
International Security Review, 6 (1981): p. 14. 
27. The damage caused to the Vietnamese economy by China's invasion in early 
1979 is huge by any estimate. According to ABC News (T.V. broadcast seen in 
Memphis, Tennessee), August 14, 1979, China caused $100 million in damage in Lon 
Son in one day during the war. During 1980 reports on Vietnam's economic situation 
were consistently dreary: noting that food rations had been cut, funds were unavailable 
to repair war damage, black marketing was flourishing, and defections from the 
military had increased. See for example, Douglas Pike, "Vietnam in 1980: The 
Gathering Story?" Asian Survey, 21 (1981). · 
28. Nayan Chanda "A Nonchalant Revolution", Far Eastern Economic Review, 
December 28, 1979, p. 22. 
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confirmed in official references by the Laotian government to the 
"enemy's fomentation of disturbances" and "international reactionar-
ies who were trying to swallow up the country."29 In September an 
editorial in a Loatian paper accused China directly of sending 
"traitorous lackeys" into Laos to "sow discord."30 
Later in the year it was said that China had organized and 
trained a division of 4,000 guerrilla fighters comprised of Laos and 
Meos, which it sent into northern Laos.31 There was also evidence 
that this was an ongoing policy: late in the year China accepted a 
number of Laotian refugees (as many as 10,000)- but only young men 
- from camps in Thailand for resettlement in China. 32 At about this 
same time a Khmer Rouge radio broadcast declared that a Lao 
Socialist Party had been established in Laos (presumably with 
Chinese help) to fight Vietnamese occupation troops.33 
In reaction, the Laotian government a~cused China of massing 
troops on its border, and called on Beijing to end its foreign aid 
program in Laos.34 (China's official aid to Laos for all practical 
purposes had already been terminated.) The government also moved 
closer to Vietnam and the Soviet Union, while getting increasing 
quantities of aid from the latter.35 
Beginning in 1980 there were reports of a unifying of right and 
left-wing resistance to the Vietnamese military presence in Laos.36 In 
mid-year a Khmer Rouge radio broadcast from China announced the 
formation of the Lao National Liberation Front and during the rest of 
the year commented on its "victories."37 At about this same time 
China's official news agency started publishing reports of insurgency 
in Laos, indicating open and official support for guerrilla groups 
acting against the Laotian government and Vietnamese military 
forces there.38 In September, Agence France-Presse reported that four 
Lao opposition groups had joined to form the Lao People's National 
29. This statement. was made by Premier Kaysone. See Asia 1980 Yearbook, p. 
220. 
30. Siang Pasason (Vientaine), September 25, 1979, cited in Ibid, p. 221. 
31. Asia Yearbook 1980, p. 222, citing a "Bangkok source." 
32. Ibid. 
33. Ibid, p. 221. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid, p. 222. 
36. Asahi Shinbun (Tokyo), January 20, 1980, cited in Stanley S. Bedlington, 
"Laos in 1980: The Portents are Ominous," Asian Survey, 21 (1981): 109. 
37. Asia Yearbook 1981, p. 182. 
38. Bedlington, "Laos in 1980," p. 108. 
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Liberation front and that the latter's efforts were being coordinated 
with t}:10se of the Khmer Rouge.39 
However, in counterposition to what the above indicates there 
was no hard evidence that insurgency had become an unmanageable 
problem in Laos. Also, as already noted the government of Laos 
received increasing amounts of Soviet aid during the period. Clearly 
there was no indication that China was going to match the military 
equipment given by the Soviet Union to government forces. Thus, 
China appeared to want to support a guerrilla war rather than a 
conventional war, while tying up the opposition movements in Laos 
and Kampuchea. Again, as in the case of Kampuchea, it is difficult to 
assess China's success so far or forecast future results. 
China's aid to guerrilla forces in Afghanistan is even more 
difficult to analyze than its aid to insurgency forces in Kampuchea or 
Laos. One month after the December 1979 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan U.S. officials reported that Chinese leaders were willing 
to increase their deliveries of small arms to Moslem rebels in 
Afghanistan.40 According to this same source China was also 
supplying weapons to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Two other 
sources, however, questioned, or at least played down, China's arms 
aid to Afghan rebels. One cited four nations thought to be purveyors 
of weapons, noting that all had denied it: China, Egypt, Pakistan, 
and the U.S.41 The other source said that China was "helping with 
small arms" - but went on to add that its weapons aid was "not very 
much."42 
Shortly thereafter the Kremlin accused China and Pakistan of 
sending weapons, in addition to "well trained saboteurs and bandits" 
into Afghanistan.43 Soviet charges of Chinese involvement continued 
and were subsequently taken up by the Afghan government which 
also accused China of training insurgents."44 Beijing, however, denied 
both indictments. Later it was charged that China had established 
bases in Pakistan to train saboteurs and terrorists for use in 
Afghanistan, but again Chinese leaders denied such reports.45 
39. Asia Yearbook 1981, p. 182. 
40. Facts on File, 40 (1980): 31. 
41. Asian Wall Street Journal, January 22, 1980, p. 1. 
42. K. Wafadar, "Afghanistan in 1980: The Struggle Continues," Asian Survey, 21 
(1981): 197. 
43. Pravda, January 28, 1980, cited in Facts on File, 40 (1980): 67. 
44. FBIS, January 11, 1980, p. F8, citing a Reuters broadcast. 
45. FBIS, January 21, 1980, p. F3, citing a Reuters broadcast. 
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By late 1980 less was heard about China's aid to insurgents, 
apparently meaning that it was not terribly significant, or that China 
had terminated its help to Afgan rebels - though more likely the 
former. Chinese leaders probably perceived that its aid alone would 
have little effect, and, therefore, took a wait-and-see attitude, hoping 
that the U.S. and some other countries would do more. Beijing may 
also have perceived that it could be more effective by limiting its 
direct aid to the Afgan rebels while providing military aid to 
Pakistan, which as will be seen in the next section, was quite 
substantial. This tack, from China's point of view, probably guaran-
teed that it would not be acting alone, and, therefore, that it did not 
have to worry about retaliation from the Soviet Union or a direct 
confrontation with the Kremlin. Unlike the situation in Southeast 
Asia, Afghanistan's small border with China did not provide a supply 
route for Chinese weapons and supplies ancl was early on secured by 
Soviet forces. Also, Beijing probably observed that the situation in 
Afghanistan had already attracted considerable international atten-
tion and was very detrimental to Moscow's global image, thus China's 
aid was unnecessary and may have been seen to give Moscow an 
excuse for a presence in Afghanistan. 
Elsewhere, China provided assistance to several insurgency 
groups or movements in Africa, though information is sparse on 
Beijing's activities there. In early 1979 Chinese Vice-Premier Li 
Xiannian visited Africa and met with Robert Mugabe, leader of 
ZANU, the movement to "liberate" Rhodesia. Li reportedly promised 
Mugabe further arms aid including military advisors.46 This report is 
borne out by the fact that after Mugabe came to power relations with 
China were good and Beijing made a meaningful (large by Chinese 
standards) promise of economic assistance to his government. (This 
aid is discussed in a following section.) 
During the same visit Li also promised aid to the Southwest 
African People's Organization (SW APO), though again no details 
concerning the size or value of this aid were made available.47 
Chinese leaders obtensibly wanted to maintain to some degree their 
reputation as a supporter of black Africans while providing an 
alternative to Soviet aid to SW APO. Beijing may have chosen to 
announce this aid to counter charges made by the Kremlin during the 
year concerning China's trade with South Africa. 
46. "Quarterly Chrmiicle and Documentation," China Quarterly, 78 (1979): 418. 
47. Ibid. 
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China also rendered assistance to other African groups as 
reflected in the presence of an estimated 500 Chinese military 
advisors on the continent.48 Clearly not all of these, and probably not 
even a sizeable majority, were assisting national armies. China 
wanted to keep its aid to such groups secret in view of its efforts to 
improve its ties with Western nations and its desire to be seen as a 
legitimate and law abiding member of the world community. 
Aid to Non-Communist Asian Nations 
China officially provided economic aid to five non-Communist 
countries during 1979 and six during 1980. (See Tables 11 and 12).49 
All of these nations had received Chinese assistance before, although 
Thailand had received only Red Cross emergency assistance on a one 
time basis in 1978.50 Although the number of African nations to 
receive Chinese assistance during the period was much larger, 
non-Communist nations received bigger donations and as a bloc 
received more. The strategy behind China's aid giving in this region 
seems to relate in part to offsetting India's influence on the South 
Asia subcontinent - a constant goal of Chinese foreign policy 
decision makers. It also related to the conflicts in Southeast Asia; 
more particularly the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea (though 
clearly this goes further in explaining China's aid to insurgency 
groups), and to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - especially in 
China's military aid to Pakistan. 
48. David D. Newsom, "communism in Africa," African Report, January-February 
1980, p. 47. The author was formerly U.S. Undersecretary for Political Affairs and this 
article is based upon his testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs on October 18, 1979, thus the figure cited should be 
regarded as an official U.S. Department of State estimate. 
49. Two more non-Communist Asian countries may be added to the list of 
recipients of Chinese aid during 1979-80. China reported handing over a hospital built 
with Chinese aid in Afghanistan in early 1979; however, it is unclear if this was 
anything more than formalizing an earlier agreement and perhaps attempting to gain 
some publicity for a project finished months earlier. See New China News Agency, 
March 6, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, March 1979, p. 7. Afghanistan was not 
technicially a communist country at that time. As noted in the introduction it was also 
reported that China turned over a hospital to the Afghanistan government in 1980. It 
was also reported that China had made an agreement with the government of the 
Philippines to supply that country with 1.2 million tons of petroleum at "friendship 
prices." See Financial Times (India) July 9, 1979, p. 3. By most accounts this would not 
be considered economic aid. 
50. See Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1978," supra note 5, Table 4. 
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Pakistan was the largest recipient of Chinese assistance during 
the period, the majority of China's aid to Pakistan consisting of arms 
and other military aid. Moreover, some of China's "economic aid" to 
Pakistan patently had military uses or implications. Early in the 
year it was reported that construction was underway on the last link 
of the Chinese-aided Karakoram Highway linking Pakistan with 
China.51 Two months later it was announced that a heavy foundry 
and forge completed in 1977 had been commissioned.52 A few months 
after this, China reported on work being done on a sports complex, 
which included a stadium that would seat 50,000 people.53 
In August 1980 it was reported that a team of Chinese technical 
experts was to arrive soon to finalize the construction of electric 
transmissions lines from Tarbela to Mardan and finish a grid station 
in the latter city.54 The cost of this project was put at $21 million; 
however, it is uncertain how much of this was Chinese aid, when the 
grant was actually made, or what conditions attached were.55 At 
about this same time it was reported that Chinese technicians were 
working on the expansion of a cement plant at Daudkhel.56 No further 
details, however, were provided. A protocol on this project was 
apparently signed in December, suggesting that the Chinese techni-
cians mentioned above were doing some surveying or conducting a 
feasibility study.57 Mention was also made of a 100 million rupee 
($10.1 million) sheet glass plant that was scheduled to go into 
production in January 1981, for which China was apparently going to 
provide the machinery.58 
During 1980 a Pakistan source summarized China's aid to 
Pakistan to date stating that China had provided Pakistan with 
military and economic assistance worth $378 million in the form of a 
$250 million interest free loan and four grants.59 This source went on 
to say that the above figures did not include any of the cost of the 
Karakorum highway and praised both the generosity of Chinese aid 
51. International Herald Tribune, February 5, 1979, cited in "Quarterly Chronicle 
and Documentation," China Quarterly, 78, (1979): 427. 
52. NCNA, April 26, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, April 1979, p. 10. 
53. NCNA, October 22, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, October 1979, p. 12. 
54. Karachi Radio, August 9, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, August 1980, p. 7. 
55. Ibid. 
56. Karachi Radio, August 4, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, August 1980, p. 7. 
57. Karachi Radio, December 8, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, December 1980, p. 7. 
58. Karachi Radio, July 31, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, August 1980, p. 7. 
59. Karachi Radio, April 30, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, May 1980, p. 9. 
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and the fact that China had given Pakistan military assistance in 
times of need and in an effort to help Pakistan attain self-reliance.60 
On the other hand, almost no mention was made in China of its 
assistance, either economic or military, to Pakistan - probably 
because the leadership feared some protest about such generosity in 
light of China's own poverty which was now being publicly admitted. 
Moreover, little was said in Pakistan about China's military aid. This 
may explain why there are much higher estimates of China's aid to 
Pakistan: military aid may have been excluded from the above 
estimate even though it was specifically cited (this is discussed 
further below). 
In the realm of Chinese military assistance to Pakistan there 
were various reports confirming substantial aid, though its value is 
difficult to estimate, and it is uncertain how critical that aid was 
considering Pakistan's needs. In June, 1979, it was reported that 
China had established a string of small military bases or posts along 
the 537-mile Karakorum Highway and along the Afghan border to 
protect against sabotage.61 This same source mentioned that there 
were up to 3,000 Chinese soldiers in Pakistan.62 In May a ceremony 
was held for a Chinese-aided factory that was said to be "defense-
oriented," though further details on the factory were not supplied.63 
Two months later another factory was reported completed. 64 This 
factory was part of a complex to rebuild tanks and make spare parts. 65 
In November a "heavy rebuild factory" which also manufactures 
arms and ammunition and which was built with Chinese aid was 
inaugurated.66 No other details were provided. 
During 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979, there were reports of vast Chinese military aid to 
Pakistan, though these reports were also contradicted by other 
reports of restrictions on Chinese military assistance to Pakistan. In 
January shortly after the invasion, Foreign Minister Huang Hua 
60. Ibid. 
61. Daily Telegraph (London), June 4, 1979, cited in the "Quarterly Chronicle and 
Documentation," China Quarterly, 78 (1979): 418. 
62. Ibid. 
63. NCNA, May 21, 1979, and AFP May 20, 1979, both cited in China Aktuell, 
May 1979, p. 12. 
64. Karachi Radio, July 8, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, July 1979, p. 8. 
65. Ibid. 
66. NCNA, November 28, 1979 and Karachi Radio, November 28, 1979, both cited 
in China Aktuell, December 1979, p. 10. 
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visited Islamabad and promised to aid Pakistan against a Soviet 
threat or Soviet forces in Afghanistan.67 He said at the time that 
China would aid Pakistan in "various ways."66 This was taken by 
foreign analysts to mean that Huang had offered extensive arms aid 
to Pakistan.69 Still another source reported that China to date had 
provided Pakistan with a total of $2 billion in military assistance 
over a 13-year period and was now rendering even more arms aid to 
Pakistan.70 These reports were offset, however, to some extent by the 
fact that President Zia traveled to China in mid-year and reportedly 
was promised weapons - but at increased prices and on a cash and 
carry basis. 71 This may have reflected the Chinese position that 
Pakistan also needed to obtain U.S. arms, indicating some displea-
sure about Pakistan's negative reaction to a U.S. arms offer at the 
time. Alternatively, Pakistan may have asked for more than China 
could or perceived it could deliver and for that reason was rebuffed. 
Later in the year reports of extensive Chinese military aid to 
Pakistan again appeared. According to an Indian source, China had 
agreed to provide Pakistan with jet fighters, ground-to-air missiles 
and other arms following to an agreement signed earlier in the year.72 
The Indian Defense Ministry subsequently reported that Pakistan 
was to receive 65 Fan tan jet fighters (an improved design of the MIG 
19) and a sizeable number of ground-to-air SAM-2 missiles that 
would be placed around Pakistan's nuclear development facilities and 
other strategic targets in accordance with a secret agreement made 
between the two countries when Pakistan's Air Force chief was in 
Beijing in June.73 Both Pakistan and China, however, denied the 
above cited reports. Pakistan also said that statements about Chinese 
troops and nuclear rockets in Pakistan were "fabrications by foreign 
media."74 
Sri Lanka was the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign aid 
during the period 1979-80. In August 1979 Prime Minister Premeda-
sa visited Beijing and was offered a 500 million rupee ($32 million) 
67. Facts on File, 40, (1980): p. 44. 
68. Asia Yearbook 1981, p. 270. 
69. Kyodo New Service, January 22, 1980, cited in FBIS, January 23, 1980, p. Fl. 
70. Mohemmed Aftab, "China Confirms Aid to Pakistan in Face of Threat by 
Soviet Union," The Asia Wall Street Journal, January 22, 1980, p. 2. 
71. Asia Yearbook 1981, p. 218. 
72. Asian Wall Street Journal, November 1, 1980, p. 1. 
73. Asia Bulletin, December 1980, p. 35. 
74. NCNA, November 24, 1980, cited in FBIS, November 26, 1980, p. Fl. 
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interest-free loan repayable over a period of 20 years. 75 The loan, hke 
most of China's aid donations during the period, was not announced 
publicly in China. It was, however, described in Sri Lanka as 
designated for three projects: a marketing complex in Columbo, water 
supply facilities, and the development of modern villages.76 Prior to 
this agreement, which was one of the biggest Chinese promises to Sri 
Lanka in recent years, China had signed a rice-for-rubber deal. 
Judging from the fact that a number of earlier such agreements with 
Sri Lanka had contained some advantage to Sri Lanka in terms of 
prices, and because negotiations were made in the wake of major 
cyclone damage to Sri Lanka's rice fields, there was ostensibly some 
grant factor in the deal. 77 China also provided hydroelectric units for 
four projects under construction in Sri Lanka in 1979, though this 
may have constituted aid already promised.78 
During 1980 more Chinese technicians arrived in Sri Lanka, 
presumably to work on projects already negotiated and designed. 79 
This suggests the immediate working out of details so that the aid 
promised in 1979 could be drawn and used. Little else was said about 
economic aid in subsequent months, though China also made one 
agreement to provide military aid to Sri Lanka. This consisted of the 
gift of two "fast gunboats" to the government of Sri Lanka late in the 
year to be used for sea surveillance and rescue.80 
According to two different sources China provided loans to the 
Burmese government worth either $67 million or $80 million.81 
Neither source cited details or provided documentation and nothing 
was said by either government to confirm a large grant of aid during 
the year. On the other hand, various other sources confirmed that a 
significant amount of aid was given and used, at least during the 
latter half of 1979 and early 1980. For example, in August 1979 an 
unofficial Burmese source reported that China had provided $7 
million worth of equipment for a textile mill project in Burma.82 Early 
75. W.A. Wiswa Warnapala, "Sri Lanka 1979: New Stress in the Economy and· 
Polity," Asian Survey 21 (1980): 212. 
76. China Aktuell, August 1979, p. 10. No source is cited. 
77. Asia Research Bulletin, March 31, 1979, p. 545. 
78. Colombo Radio, May 26, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, June 1979, p. 12. 
79. Colombo Radio, February 6, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, February 1980, p. 7. 
80. NCNA, December 1, 1980, cited in FBIS, December 2, 1980, p. Fl. 
81. Asia Yearbook 1981, p. 149 cites the smaller amount; William L. Scully and 
Frank N. Trager, "Burma 1979: Reversing the Trend," Asian Survey, 20 (1980): 170-71 
cite the larger figure. 
82. Radio Rangoon, August 1, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, August 1979, p. 10. 
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in 1980 China reported that a rubber ball factory started in 1978 in 
Burma had been completed.83 The factory, it said, would manufacture 
50,000 balls per year.84 In July China announced eight large building 
projects under construction in Burma, apparently in fulfillment of the 
aid granted in 1979.85 
Later in the year, however, there were reports of China again 
providing more support for insurgents in Burma and at year's end it 
was uncertain whether Burma would still be allowed to draw on 
Chinese aid.86 This was typical of China's past aid relationship with 
Burma- an on-and-off again affair. 
In Nepal a textile mill was inaugurated in January 1979, built 
with Chinese aid at a cost of 180 million rupees. 87 According to 
sources in Nepal the mill will employ 400 workers when put into full 
operation.85 A month later a brick factory, started in 1977 and 
capable of producing 20 million bricks a year, was completed and 
handed over to the Nepal government.89 And in September an 
86-meter long bridge, started in 1979, was completed.90 
In April a Chinese technical team arrived in Nepal to do survey 
work for a paper plant.91 This was apparently a follow-up of aid 
promised in 1978.92 Late in the year an agreement was made on a 
paper mill, which was reported to be the first of its kind in Nepal and 
said to be capable of producing 10 tons of stationery paper per day.93 
It is uncertain, however, if this was a new agreement or the final 
arrangements for a deal made earlier. During 1980 Chinese sources 
mentioned other projects under construction, but failed to give any 
further information. While there was some delay in road projects 
during this period, other evidence indicated that China's aid to Nepal 
was both significant and useful and that it would continue - keeping 
83. NCNA, May 10, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, May 1980, p. 9. 
84. Ibid. 
85. NCNA, July 4, 1980, cited in "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," The 
China Quarterly 84 (1980): p. 815. 
86. International Herald Tribune, August 13, 1980, cited in "Quarterly Chronicle 
and Documentation," China Quarterly 86 (1980): p. 815. 
87. Kathmandu Radio, January 19, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979, p. 
5. 
88. Kathmandu Radio, December 30, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979, 
p. 5. 
89. NCNA, February 20, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, February 1979, p. 14. 
90. NCNA, September 21, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, September 1979, p. 12. 
91. Kathmandu Radio, April 5, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, April 1979, p. 10. 
92. See Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1978," supra notes, at 20-21. 
93. NCNA, December 27, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, December 1979, p. 10. 
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Nepal from becoming too dependent on India economically or 
politically. 
In February 1980 China signed an agreement with the govern-
ment of Bangladesh to supply machinery for a composite textile mill 
that will use 2,500 spindles and 250 looms.94 In August a Chinese 
technical team was reported at work on a fertilizer plant for which 
China had agreed to provide technical assistance, machinery and 
supervisory service.95 Two agreements were also signed by the two 
governments in mid-year when President Ziar Rahman visited 
China; according to these agreements China will "provide loans to 
Bangladesh.'096 No details, however, were released on these loans 
concerning the amount, conditions or time of repayment. Clearly 
China wishes to maintain friendly ties with the government of 
Bangdalesh and regards a friendly Bangladesh as crucial to, balanc-
ing India's influence in South Asia. 
According to one source, China promised military aid to Thailand 
during 1979;however, no confirmation of this could be made and no 
details were provided by that source.97 In the context of China's aid to 
Pol Pot's fo~ces in Kampuchea and the threat of Vietnamese forces on 
the Thai-Kampuchean border this report had some credibility. This. 
was especially so in mid-1980 when, after Vietnamese forces crossed_ 
the border into Thailand, China openly promised to help Thailandin 
the event of continued incursions or-a prolonged struggle. 
In July 1979 China provided an official donation of aid to the 
Thai government in the form of a gift of three Chinese-made road_ 
sweepers.98 Much more Chinese aid was provided to Thailand, 
however, in the form of refugee aid, which has already been cited. In 
any event, it was clear that China sought close relations with 
Thailand because of the conflicts in Kampuchea and Laos in view of 
China's support of the insurgency movements there. China also 
sought to support Bangkok's position on not recognizing the Heng 
Samrin government in Kampuchea. 
Aid to African Nations 
During 1979 China granted or delivered aid to 23 African 
countries; during 1980 twenty-five African nations, received Chinese 
94. Dacca Radio, March 1, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, March 1980, p. 27. 
95. Dacca Radio, August 21, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, August 1980, p. 7. 
96. NCNA, July 24, 1980, cited in FBIS, July 25, 1980, p. 13. 
97. "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," China Quarterly, 90 (1989): 899. 
98. NCNA, July 21, 1979, cited in FBIS, August 3, 1979, p. Al. 
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assistance (See Tables 13 & 14). Unlike aid given insurgency 
movements and to non-Communist Asian countries, most of China's 
help to African countries was in small amounts and much was in the 
form of medical teams and agricultural projects. Several African 
countries also received emergency assistance and two or three got 
arms aid. Compared to the recent past Beijing was clearly less 
interested in financing large, expensive projects in Africa ostensibly 
due to the need for capital to finance its own development. Following 
nearly a decade-long trend Chinese decision makers continued to 
avoid competition with Western aid and devoted most of their efforts 
to countering Soviet influence in Africa. In fact, it seemed more and 
more true that China's aid efforts were aimed at following the lead of 
the U.S. and other Western countries in terms of dealing with Soviet 
influence. 
During 1980 the only nations to receive aid from China where 
the amount was cited were in Africa - Kenya, Zimbabwe, and 
Tanzania and Zambia for the Tanzam Railroad. In the case of the 
grant to Kenya - China's largest in the area during the two year 
period - there was some hint of a shift of interest from Tanzania to 
Kenya as China's favorite in Africa. Aid to Zimbabwe represents an 
extension of help that China granted to Robert Mugabe during the 
civil war and an effort to assist him after coming to power, having an 
edge over the Soviet Union in terms of his friendship. Aid to 
Tanzania and Zambia represents an effort by China to maintain its 
largest aid project ever and probably can be seen as a move to ensure 
that the project does not fall into disuse and result in a loss of face for 
China's foreign aid program. 
In September 1980 Kenya's President visited China and at the 
time was granted a $50 million interest-free loan to be drawn in the 
next ten years and to be used in the areas of rice growing and the 
development of geothermal projects.99 The size of this loan and the 
fact that Vice-Premier Ji Pengfei had visited Kenya in August, while 
neglecting to visit Tanzania on this trip, prompted some speculation 
that China was shifting its emphasis in Africa to Kenya in order to 
build a strategic anti-Soviet coalition there. 100 Since the United States 
had been offered basing rights in Kenya in the wake of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan it may also be seen to represent China's 
99. Nairobi Radio, September 20, 1980, cited in African Report, November-
December 1980, p. 31. 
100. See "Chronicle and Documentation," China Quarterly 84 (1980): 815-16. 
101. Africa Report, November-December 1980, p. 31 citing both Africa Research 
Bulletin, September 30, 1980 and Nairobi Radio, September 20, 1980. 
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willingness to follow the U.S. lead in Africa in countering Soviet 
influence. Beijing may likewise have been motivated in making this 
loan by the fact that it had already invested considerable aid funds in 
a multimillion dollar sports complex near Nairobi where the 
All-Africa Games will be held in 1982.101 Clearly China will gain 
considerable publicity for its aid at that time. 
China's second largest aid donation in Africa during the period 
under study and the only aid donation to be announced publically in 
China was a $26.7 million interest-free loan to Zimbabwe in 
September 1980.102 This loan was made in Chinese currency and with 
provision that it be drawn over the next five years. 103 China's decision 
to make this donation related to China's long friendship with Robert 
Mugabe and its support for him and his guerrilla movement, ZANU, 
for a number of years.104 On the other hand it was reported that the 
Soviet Union during 1979 became a major arms suppliers to 
Zimbabwe; in fact, such supplies were equal to China's. Thus, 
Beijing's aid may have been an effort to counter Soviet 
enchroachments.105 
The only other announced aid donation of any size was a $12.8 
million grant to Tanzania and Zambia to buy spare parts for the 
trains running on the Tanzam Railroad.106 Beijing may have also 
separately agreed to repair embankments on the railroad in Tanzania 
and bridges blown up in Zambia during the Rhodesian Civil war. 107 If 
this is true, the above cited figure underrepresents China's aid to the 
Tanzam Railroad during this period. 
The railroad, completed in 1976, was China's largest aid project 
anywhere and guaranteed China a base of operations in East 
Africa.108 However, building the line mainly for political rather than 
economic reasons and thus ignoring cost factors, the opening of 
competing transportation links for the shipment of Zambia's copper to 
port, conflict in the region, and frequent breakdowns of the Chinese-
102. NCNA, September 14, 1980, cited in FBIS, September 16, 1980, p. El. 
103. Ibid. 
104. See author's other works on China's foreign aid for details on previous aid to 
Mugabe and ZANU. It is noteworthy that China has provided weapons and supplies for 
several thousand guerrillas under Mugabe's leadership in recent years. 
105. See New York Times, June 3, 1979, p. IV 3. 
106. International Herald Tribune, September 2, 1980, cited in "Chronicle and 
Documentation," China Quarterly. 
107. See Africa Report, November-December 1980, p. 34, which cites several other 
sources. 
108. See Copper, CmNA's FoREIGN Am, pp. 103-08. 
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designed diesel locomotives have all caused the line to accumulate a 
large debt - in the range of $26 million by 1980.109 In providing the 
above cited aid China appeared to want to bail out the rail line and 
prevent the loss of prestige that might result from the line not being 
used or from the purchase of replacement locomotives elsewhere.110 
China continued to provide military aid to a number of African 
countries during 1979-80. As noted earlier an estimated 500 Chinese 
military advisors were in the region during the period. On the other 
hand, little was said or written about China's arms aid to African 
nations, probably because Beijing wanted to kt=lep a low profile so as 
to legitimately portray the Soviet Union as the arms purveyor to the 
region. Also, since Moscow can provide more and better weapons than 
China and frequently delivers weapons to nations at odds with 
nations being helped by China or uses Chinese aid as an excuse for 
sending military hardware, African nations are hesitant to say 
anything about obtaining Chinese military assistance. 
Nevertheless, in early 1979 the President of Somalia stated that 
China was giving his country arms as well as other aid.m No details, 
however, were given by Somalia's president. Zaire was also reported-
ly receiving Chinese military aid, though again no details were made 
available. 112 
In addition to its official aid and military assistance given during 
the period 1979-80, China rendered considerable help to a sizeable 
number of African countries in the form of project aid, agricultural 
assistance and medical aid. Project aid was the most expensive for 
China and gave China more visibility in Africa than elsewhere. 
Agricultural assistance and medical aid, however, gave Beijing a 
greater physical presence in African countries, certainly relatively to 
their cost. In all of these areas China had already proven its 
capabilities. And its aid projects have been and will no doubt 
continue to'be finished as designed and will be useful to the recipient 
nation. On the other hand, during the period China cut the number of 
large projects undertaken, probably for a combination of two reasons: 
they are too costly when seen against China's own needs for 
development capital at home, and they have not been as successful as 
smaller projects (witness the Tanzam Railroad). This, however, 
109. Africa Report, November-December 1980, p. 34. 
110. West German-made locomotives were being considered for replacements for 
the Chinese-made locomotive. See ibid. 
111. Kessing's Contemporary Archieves 25 (1979): 29877. 
112. Africa Report, November-December 1980, p. 33. 
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should not be taken as evidence that China is ending or will in the 
near future terminate its foreign aid program. China's foreign aid 
giving clearly serves a purpose, and it has witnessed a number of 
rises and declines in the past. 
In the area of project aid, five to ten new major projects were 
agreed upon each year during the period and about the same number 
were under construction or completed. (See Tables 15 and 16). This is 
a marked decrease in the number of projects promised or started in 
the past several years, especially when compared to the more than 
twenty projects negotiated or put under construction in 1978.113 The 
most popular kinds of projects were road and bridge construction, 
public buildings and dams and other water projects. China also 
announced starting work on a textile mill and a farm implements 
factory. This generally follows past preferences and reflects a policy 
of negotiating the kinds of projects China has been best at in the past. 
Cape Verde, Mali, Mauritius, Upper Volta and Zambia were the 
most important recipients of new project aid during 1979. Burundi, 
Madagascar, Mauritainia, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Tanzania were 
the major benefactors of new projects in 1980. This list reflects a 
rather even distribution between East and West Africa and between 
large and small nations. 
Agricultural aid ranked second in terms of costs as a category of 
aid projects. Details were available on a half a dozen projects started 
or finished during each of the two years under consideration. (See 
Tables 17 and 18). The fact that a larger number of projects was 
completed than started seems to suggest that China may be 
considering phasing out its agricultural aid projects. On the other 
hand this probably reflects more the fact that China has cut, and is 
still in the process of cutting, its aid program. Moreover, China has 
started giving sizeable amounts of famine relief and related kinds of 
aid through the United Nations and other global organizations, and 
is now giving less publicity to its aid giving. Undoubtedly, some 
projects have gone unreported. 
Jn contrast to its project and agricultural aid during 1979-80 
China's medical assistance showed an increase. A slightly larger 
number of medical teams - 13 in 1979 and 8 in 1980 - were sent to 
African countries than in past years. (See Tables 19 and 20). This 
may reflect a perceived need by Chinese leaders for a greater 
presence in Africa; but it may also be an effort to cut expenses in aid 
113. See Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1978," supra note 5. 
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giving since medical aid is much less expensive than other kinds of 
aid. 
China's medical aid teams sent during 1979-80, as in past years, 
generally consisted of five to twenty people trained as paramedics. 
Only in the case of Algeria was a large medical team sent, and only 
in the case of Tanzania were doctors specifically noted among the 
medical personnel. Finally, only in the case of the Congo was there 
medical equipment or medicine in any significant value given, except 
in the case of the hospitals completed in Mauritania and Sierra 
Leone. 
In the case of China's aid to African nations, probably more of 
China's assistance went unreported during the period than elsewhere 
because of its unwillingness to document its aid giving, plus the fact 
that smaller donations were not cited in other sources. In addition, 
Chinese aid to African nations is less novel and interesting than it 
has been in past years and is now regarded by only a few observers as 
a threat to Western interests. Thus a number of aid promises made to 
African nations in the past few years where follow-up information 
was unavailable probably suggests that they have simply not been 
reported. Some may have been delayed, but because of China's 
reputation in the aid field in Africa and its concern about perserving 
its leadership role among Third World countries, probably few have 
been cancelled. 
Aid to Nations in Other Regions 
China's foreign assistance during 1979-80 to nations other than 
in the two geographic regions already discussed consisted primarily 
of aid to nations in Northern Africa and the Middle East. (See Tables 
21 and 22.) China gave the most aid to Egypt, primarily in the form 
of military aid. In the case of several other Middle Eastern countries 
China's foreign aid program was in the process of being transformed 
into construction and other aid-type projects for profit. As in the case 
of its cutting back on its aid giving, this is explained by China's need 
for investment capital, especially foreign exchange, and the fact that 
a number of Middle Eastern countries have vast quantities of oil 
money or are helped by those that do. 
Elsewhere, China's aid giving during the period reflected no new 
interests of importance, with Malta and Guyana the only recipients 
in Europe or Latin America, other than recipients of emergency aid. 
This seemed to reflect the fact that Chinese leaders perceive their 
capabilities as limited and have little or no desire to expand their aid 
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giving into new regions, especially where they have little or no hope 
of competing with the Soviet Union. Although Latin American 
countries are receptive to China's aid, Beijing apparently views the 
region as one where only the United States can stave off Soviet 
intrusions, while it, China, can do very little to help. On the other 
hand, Beijing did provide some emergency aid to Jamaica and the 
Dominican Republic as noted in the introduction. It also granted 
emergency aid to Fiji for the first time and with that donation set a 
precedent in helping a nation in that part of the world. 
In June 1979 Egypt's President Sadat in a public address made 
reference to Chinese military assistance. Subsequently he elaborated 
upon his statement saying that Egypt had received forty Shenyang 
F-6 jet fighters (Chinese version of the MiG-19), noting that four were 
already in service.114 He also revealed that negotiations were in 
progress for forty or fifty more and that Egypt in return had given 
China a Soviet MiG-23, which China had been anxious to obtain to 
facilitate its aircraft manufacturing capabilities.115 Whether this 
transaction consisted of a loan or a gift on China's part is uncertain. 
Its value is also difficult to estimate. Another source noted that Egypt 
planned to use the Chinese aircraft at an air base south of Cairo to 
allow its MiG-21 fleet to be deployed closer to the Libyan border.116 
Still another source mentioned that at least part of the aircraft would 
be used for training purposes.117 
In any case, the deal was made in the context of tensions between 
Egypt and Libya and the conclusion of the Camp David agreements, 
which was followed by a partial cutoff of military aid by important 
Arab suppliers. In this transaction China sought to help Egypt 
diversify its arms sources and to gain some leverage or influence over 
the situation in the Middle East. Chinese leaders probably perceived 
that the accords reached between Egypt and Israel provided some 
hope of stability in the area - to the disadvantage of the Soviet 
Union, thereby hampering the Kremlin's efforts to expand its naval 
presence into the Indian Ocean and on to Southeast Asia. The 
Chinese delivery of military aid to Egypt may also be seen as related 
114. Kessings Contemporary Archives, 25 (1979): 29953. 
115. Ibid. 
116. See Financial Times, June 21 and 23, 1979 and Guardian, June 6, 1979, cited 
in Africa Report, September-October 1979, p. 35. 
117. John R. W. Taylor (ed.), Janes All the World's Aircraft, 1980-81 (London: 
Janes Publishing Co., 1981), p. 33. 
CHINA's FoREIGN Am IN 1979-80 27 
to improving U.S.-China relations and as an effort on the part of 
Chinese leaders to support U.S. policy in the Middle East. 
In addition to military assistance China also provided Egypt with 
economic aid in the form of technical help in building a fish farm 
complex of more than seventy separate nurseries that also raise 
ducks and fruit trees. 118 The project, which was started in 1979 and is 
due to be completed in 1982, is being built by a private company with 
local investors - representing one of the few known cases where 
China has provided assistance to a private enterprise. On the other 
hand no details were provided on the size or scope of Chinese help, 
which may or may not have been very significant. 
The next most important country in terms of the amount of aid 
received from China was North Yemen. Here, however, a sizeable 
portion of China's projects were paid for, thereby not constituting aid. 
There were a number of projects undertaken, some in each category 
and some undesignated or uncertain. In May 1979 Chinese sources 
mentioned technicians at work on a forty-eight kilometer long road in 
North Yemen that was started in 1974.119 Since this was originally an 
aid project it seems unlikely that it was renegotiated into a project for 
which China was to receive payment. At about the same time 
mention was also made of a foundation laying ceremony for an 
oil-pressing plant to be built with Chinese aid. 120 However, no details 
were provided regarding the conditions of financing or repayment. 
At nearly the same time a Chinese survey team arrived in North 
Yemen to do preliminary surveying and other work for an interna-
tional conference building that was to be built by China at North 
Yemen's expense. 121 A few months later, in August 1979, it was 
reported that the China Road and Bridge Construction Company had 
signed four contracts with the government of North Yemen - two to 
build an airport and heliport and two for roads- involving a total 
cost of $10 million.122 Since the announcement, which came from an 
official Chinese source, used the word contract it must be assumed 
that North Yemen paid for this project also. 
Two agreements were made, one in May and another in 
December 1979 that may or may not consist of Chinese aid. In May a 
118. NCNA, December 7, 1989, cited in China Aktuell, December 1980, p. 7. 
119. NCNA, May 4, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, May 1979, p. 12. 
120. NCNA, May 20, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, May 1979, p. 12. 
121. NCNA, March 19, 1979, cited in FBIS, March 23, 1979, p. F2. 
122. NCNA, August (no date indicated), 1979, cited in China Aktuell, August 1979, 
p. 10. 
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ceremony was held on the starting of a cement plant, but insufficient 
details were provided to determine if it was an aid project or not. 123 In 
December an agreement was reached on the expansion of a textile 
mill, but again sufficient details were lacking to determine the 
nature of the agreement.124 
In early 1980 China sent fifty-one medical workers to North 
Yemen to work in a general hospital, according to a protocol 
agreement signed at the time which stated that they would be paid 
for their services.126 In addition to these medical workers China also 
dispatched eleven agrotechnicians and twenty-seven textile techni-
cians, all under contract - presumably meaning that they were to be 
paid.126 In June the official news agency in China reported that the 
China Construction Engineering Corporation and the China Road 
and Bridge Engineering Company had signed more than twenty 
contracts with the government of North Yemen.127 In July and again 
in December 1980 mention was made of a radio and television 
building and a housing cooperative built by Chinese engineers and 
workers in North Yemen, apparently according to agreements signed 
earlier.126 All of these projects were apparently paid for by North 
Yemen. 
In August the foundation was laid for a Chinese aided canal 
project in Tunisia that, according to details released on the project, 
will be 123 kilometers in length and constitutes the main part of the 
nation's water conservancy plan in the northern part of the country 
and will help irrigate 20,000 hectares of farmland. 129 This project was 
negotiated in 1978 and was projected to cost $17 million, of which 
China was to provide $8 million.130 In terms of China's foreign policy 
objectives the project represents an effort to maintain close ties with 
a friendly nation in the Middle East. 
In November 1979 a sports complex built with Chinese economic 
assistance was completed in Syria.131 This project was also negotiated 
in 1978, though details concerning its cost and conditions of the 
123. NCNA, May 4, 1979, cited in FBIS, May 17, 1979, p. 14. 
124. NCNA, December 26, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, December 1979 p. 10. 
125. NCNA, January 29, 1980, cited in FBIS January 30, 1980, p. 12. 
126. Ibid. 
127. NCNA, June 30, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, June 1980, p. 9. 
128. NCNA, July 10, 1980 cited in China Aktuell, July 1980, p. 9; NCNA, 
December 16, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, December 1980, p. 7. 
129. NCNA, August 15, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, August 1979, p. 10. 
130. See Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1978," supra note 5, at 39-40. 
131. NCNA, November 16, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, November 1979, p. 11. 
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agreement were revealed neither at the time the agreement was 
negotiated nor at the time of completion of the project.132 
In South Yemen in July 1979 a Chinese technical group left the 
country after helping in the operations of a salt works - a project 
completed with Chinese aid in 1976.133 In December a state-owned 
fishery built with Chinese aid was handed over to the government, 
including an ice house, repair shops, offices and storehouses that 
were part of the project. 134 In June 1980 work began on a Chinese-
aided highway project 203 kilometers in length which would link up 
to another Chinese-built highway, all part of a major highway 
network.135 In view of increasingly closer Soviet-South Yemen 
relations it appeared in 1979 that Chinese aid operations consisted of 
merely closing shop; however, the starting of a new project in 1980 
seems to suggest something quite different. Chinese leaders appeared 
to perceive that a presence in South Yemen was still worthwhile or 
that they might have some chance of maintaining good relations with 
the government of South Yemen despite the Soviet presence. 
In Iraq in mid-1980 a bridge built with Chinese aid (completed in 
1979) was opened to traffic, while Chinese technicians completed the 
approaches. 136 China desired a presence in Iraq to help counter the 
influence ofthe Soviet Union there, but in view of China's tilt toward 
Iran in the conflict between Iran and Iraq it appears that Chinese aid 
to Iraq probably came to an end in 1980. 
The only other Middle Eastern country to receive Chinese aid 
during 1979-80 was the Sudan. In July 1979 it was announced that a 
Chinese-aid fishery project there had opened. 137 No other details were 
provided. A Chinese medical team was also sent to Sudan in 1979.138 
Considering the level of Chinese aid activity in the Sudan in 1978, 
1979-80 shows a severe cutting back - though no reason can be 
suggested other than the fact that China simply had less money and 
resources to devote to its foreign aid program during the period. 
Elsewhere, China continued a major aid project in Malta started 
several years ago: a large dry dock faciliiy capable of repairing 
300,000-ton ~~ips. In July 1979 it was reported that construction was 
132. See Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1978," supra note 5, at 40. 
133. NCNA, July 1, 1979, cited in FBIS, July 19, 1979, p. 13. 
134. Ibid. 
135. NCNA, June 23, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, June 1980, p. 0. 
136. NCNA, July 19, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, July 1980, p. 9. 
137. NCNA, July 26, 1979, cited in FBIS, July 27, 1979, p. 16. 
138. NCNA, January 6, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979, p. 5. 
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proceeding apace and that the facility would be finished in a year. 139 
In late 1980 it was revealed that China had signed an agreement on 
the construction of a breakwater, suggesting that the dry dock had 
been or was near completion - though there was no announcement 
to that effect.140 
As in the case of non-communist Europe, there was only one 
Latin American nation to receive foreign aid from China during 
1979-80: Guyana. In February 1980 the official Chinese news agency 
reported that a textile mill was under construction in Guyana using 
Chinese foreign aid, and later in the year reported that the mill, 
using 15,000 spindles and over 400 looms, had been completed.141 This 
project was started in 1976 and had received frequent praise from the 
Guyana government. 
Conclusions 
China's foreign aid giving during 1979-80 reflects some new 
directions in Chinese foreign policy as well as some continuations of 
old trends. In both realms a number of specifics are worth men-
tioning. 
In terms of its size and scope China's foreign aid program de-
clined, though perhaps not as much as might have been expected con-
sidering Chi~a's _policy priorities. The big drop had already been 
experienced in 1977 and 1978 when China decreased and finally cut 
completely its aid to its two largest recipients - Vietnam and 
Albania. The period under study saw no evidence of any plan to 
reverse this decision; in fact, China was more hostile than ever 
toward Vietnam and the Chinese invasion of the northern part of 
Vietnam and continued tension and even fighting on the border after 
the spring of 1979 may in a sense be seen as an effort to take its aid 
back, or at least to cost Vietnam for its ungratefulness for past 
Chinese largess. In the case of Albania, Beijing seemed simply to 
have no interest in putting relations back on track. Thus, in contrast 
to its past pattern of aid giving, little aid was given to communist 
bloc nations during 1979-80. However, this does not represent an 
abandoning of its interests in the bloc; rather it represents political 
realities and greater opportunities elsewhere. China continued to 
139. NCNA, November 20, 1980, cited in FBIS, November 21, 1980, p. Gl. 
140. NCNA, November 20, 1980, cited in FBIS, November 21, 1980, p. G2. 
141. NCNA, February 20, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, February 1980, p. 7; NCNA, 
May 28, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, May 1980, p. 9. 
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compete with the Kremlin for leadership of communist nations in 
various other ways. 
There was also a significant decline in China's willingness to 
provide economic help to other countries because of the high priority 
on it, own economic dPvelopment. Chinese leaders saw greater needs 
at home and felt less generous abroad. Some of China's new leaders 
no doubt saw China's aid program, at least the broad and costly 
program built by Mao, as unnecessary and not worthwhile. On the 
other hand there was no officially voiced opposition to China's aid 
program during the two year period, in contrast to some criticism of 
China's aid giving in 1978. In short, it seems that the problem was 
more one of finding support or enthusiasm for aid giving among 
Chinese decision makers when the focus of attention was on China's 
own development. 
Thus, there were no new nations added to Chinese list of aid 
recipients - except for two or three that received emergency 
assistance for the first time. Similarily, the number of loans made 
and projects promised declined significantly. Finally, Beijing showed 
no interest in any new big projects. 
This, however, should not be seen as reflecting a decision to 
continue to reduce the foreign aid program or to scrap it piecemeal. 
The number of recipients of Chinese assistance increased in 1978 
(though the amount decreased because of dropping aid to Vietnam 
and Albania); thus it was not unusual for the number of benefactors 
to decrease during 1979-80. China's aid giving has experienced 
rather marked cycles of rises and declines in the past. Moreover, past 
experience shows that China's decisions to give aid depend primarily 
upon threats or perceived threats to its security and its relations with 
the superpowers. · 
Nevertheless, it can probably be argued that China has decided 
against giving huge amounts of aid to nations that might become 
client states. It turned out to be a failure in the cases of Vietnam and 
Albania; both turned against Chin& when they found it expedient or 
had other reasons to do so. In the case of Tanzania and Zambia where 
China undertook its largest aid project ever in the mid-1970s- the 
Tanzam Railroad - and where it also delivered large amounts of 
project and arms aid, Chinese leaders discovered that the recipients' 
appetite for aid was much larger than they had guessed and that 
their receiving aid from Western countries did not really contradict 
China's objectives in the area. China has apparently also given up 
supporting other countries financially to the point of their becoming 
dependent upon Chinese economic help. 
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Another change in China's aid policy is that of giving greater 
attention to economic feasibility in aid projects. Beijing has ostens-
ibly learned a lesson in the case of the Tanzam Railroad: if you are 
going to build a project that is not economically feasible, it requires 
r.ontinued financial support and can become both ::Jn t>r.onomic bnrcien 
and a costly investment in terms of prestige. Thus Chinese decision 
makers during 1979-80 gave more attention to whether projects could 
be finished as designed and whether they would be self-sustaining. 
Hence there was a preference for smaller projects and the types of 
projects China already has considerable experience in buildings. 
Similarly, China reflected even less concern then in the past-
though this was never a central motive for China's aid programs -
about fostering socialist economic systems. Aid has as a rule been 
given on a government to government basis; but its use after that has 
not been of too much concern to Chinese leaders. During the period 
under study China probably for the first time - at least the first time 
where it got widespread attention- rendered aid to a private project. 
And this may be seen as something other than an isolated case: 
China seemed to be interested in investing abroad for profit or to gain 
the same kind of influence in the recipient nation that Western 
capitalist investment provides. 
It is worth repeating that China has also transformed some of its 
aid projects into projects that render a profit. In this way China has 
realized profit from its aid program, namely from the experience 
abroad it has provided and expertise in various kinds of construction. 
It seems likely that in the near future China will be competing with 
South Korea, Taiwan and a number of other countries that have 
made significant profits from overseas construction work. 
Following a previous trend of at least a decade China continued 
to compete very little with Western aid programs and aid giving. The 
only area where China may be judged to have competed with Western 
countries during the period was in southern Africa and even here it 
was not very direct (if at all meaningful competition) and seemed, 
considering trends and China's policy in the region as a whole, to 
reflect a convergence of aims, rather than growing competition. This 
was most noticably true in the case of China's aid to the government 
of Zimbabwe. 
An examination of China's aid strategy in different regions 
suggests that, whereas there were different tactics and varying 
applications of aid, its basis strategy remained intact: to reduce the 
influence of the Soviet Union abroad. In Southeast Asia China used 
its aid to sustain guerrilla movements opposed to the Soviet Union 
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and Vietnam (viewed by the Chinese as a Soviet protege in the 
region). Here China may be seen in fact to have resurrected the 
Maoist concept of supporting "wars of national liberation"- but this 
time against communist regimes supported by Hanoi and Moscow 
instead of governments supported by "Western imperialism." In 
South Asia China continued to seek to maintain a balance of power 
on the subcontinent to limit India's influence, but this must also be 
seen in the context of India's alliance and close ties with the Soviet 
Union. During 1980 Beijing became even more concerned about the 
region because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In Africa 
China's focus remained on Soviet penetration and the Kremlin's 
search for bases whereby it could expand its military influence, 
particularily its naval power, to the Indain Ocean and on. In the 
Middle East, China continued to try to exploit, on a case by case 
basis, Soviet problems in the region. Elsewhere in the world there 
was little or no change: China continued to realize its limitations. 
This cannot be translated as China abondoning its efforts to lead 
Third World nations. In fact, leadership of the Third World should 
still be seen as an important Chinese foreign policy goal. On the 
other hand, Chinese leaders more than in the past realize their limits 
in giving aid and the little promise trade with other developing 
countries has to offer. Beijing has apparently also taken cognizance of 
the fact that there is a significant interdependence between Third 
World countries (including China itself) and the West, and that 
confrontation is not something China can exploit to its own 
advantage, particularily in the context of its own development efforts. 
In this sense, China has clearly become a more status quo-oriented 
nation. 
China has shifted what should be regarded as a fairly significant 
amount of its aid funds to delivery through the U.N. and other 
international organizations, whereas in the past China's foreign aid 
was exclusively bilateral. This can be seen as a new approach to 
China's leadership of the Third World. It may also offset some fears 
among poorer countries that China will take a giant portion of the 
funds available from global lending institutions. Finally it mirrors a 
greater interest in China's part in becoming a legitimate member of 
the global community and in using its international influence against 
its arch-enemy the Soviet Union. 
During 1979-80 China gave more military assistance to non-
communist nations than in the past. However, it is too early to judge 
whether this represents a change in policy or even a trend. The needs 
and the opportunities were there; China responded. China's arms aid 
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during the period should thus be viewed on a case by case basis. And 
while China's military aid mcreased, it is still small by Soviet or 
Western standards- and this is unlikely to change. As in the case of 
economic assistance, China needs arms at home: its arms industry 
has not grown appreciably, while its own needs, or at least perceived 
needs, have increased. In short, Chinese leaders probably see 
selective arms aid as a most effective way of countering global Soviet 
expansion and it will continue to be an attractive alternative, but 
only on a situation or opportunity basis. 
China's aid during the period continued to be generous, or at 
least that is the way it would generally be assessed. Most aid was in 
the form of non-interest loans with liberal terms of repayment. Also, 
as a developing country, China has to be seen as charitable merely 
for having a foreign aid program. On the other hand Beijing 
continues to ask for repayment in goods and services, thereby 
offsetting the inflation factor which constitutes a large grant aspect 
in most Western aid that is repayable in currency rather than goods. 
And, Chinese aid remains tied to Chinese products, the choices were 
limited and, in many cases, the quality was lower or inconsistent. 
Recipient nations, however, still find Chinese aid useful - valued 
generally for the utility of the projects and the specific needs they 
fill. On the other hand it no longer evokes an aid giving response by 
Western nations to counter Chinese influence. This was particularly 
evident during 1979-80. 
In concluding, it is necessary to say something about the future 
of China's foreign aid program based upon the two-year period 
assessed here. The years 1979-80 showed a decline in China's aid 
giving and there is no reason to believe judging from its aid program 
or other information that it will increase appreciably once again in 
the next few years. Yet there is little cause to conclude that China is 
phasing out its aid giving. Aid will doubtless continue to be an 
important instrument of China's foreign policy, though Beijing will 
probably in coming years use economic assistance more as a means of 
influence in and through the U.N. Here Chinese leaders will 
doubtless experience some of the problems other nations have in this 
effort: the inefficiency of U.N. and other global aid giving institu-
tions, loss of donor recognition, and the inability to control the use of 
its aid. Because of this China is likely to also maintain a bilateral 
foreign aid program, though judging from the last two years it will 
probably be one consisting of smaller projects and types of aid in 
which China has experience, with continued emphasis on construc-
tion, agricultural and medical aid and emergency assistance. Military 
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aid will probably continue to be important and may even be increased 
as long as Sino-Soviet relations remain in their present state. 
The fact that Chinese leaders still find aid giving an easy means 
of gaining some leverage over events and political decisions in other 
countries makes it important. Similarly, it is a source of good global 
publicity - which because of China's new role in the U.N. as a 
legitimate member of the global community, is now more important 
than ever. Finally, nothing seems to have changed in that Chinese 
leaders still need to project an image of morality, if not charity and 
generosity to the rest of the world. 
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Year 
Pre-1953 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
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TABLE 1 
China's Official Aid Promises by Year 
(US$ millions) 
Amount 
75 
394.9 
12.5 
378 
112.7 
15.8 
125.6 
135.35 
298.2 
447.2 
0 
87 
344.9 
124.7 
10.5 
437.8a 
56.5 
10 
1,124.3b 
421.7 
922.5 
430 
282 
110 
140c 
119.7 - 129.7d 
121 - 177e 
99 - 112 
89.5 
Number of 
Recipients 
1 
2 
1 
2 
6 
1 
8 
6 
7 
8 
0 
3 
14 
5 
2 
6 
3 
1 
8 
14 
15 
13 
7 
5 
5 
3 
6 
2 
4 
• This included $400 million promised for the Tan-Zam Railroad. 
b This included $300 million in aid to Romania which was officially promised, but 
the amount was not disclosed. The $300 million figure is an estimate. 
< This includes $47 million which was a cost overrun on the Tan-Zam Railroad. It 
also includes an estimated $50 million in new aid to Egypt, announced without exact 
figures. It does not include $47 million to Chile which was a renegotiated loan 
originally promised to the Allende regime. 
d This includes a $52 million loan to Pakistan and a $52 to $62 million loan to 
Chile which may have been promised in previous years but was not renewed in 1977. 
• This includes a $56 million loan to Mozambique that was renegotiated in 1978. 
r Tanzania and Zambia together received a grant for the Tan-Zam Rail:-oad. 
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TABLE 2 
China's Officially Announced Aid in 1979 
Recipient 
Burma 
Sri Lanka 
Amount 
$67 to $80 million* 
Rs 500 million 
($32 million) 
Purpose/Comments 
Loan or loans for various 
projects 
Interest free loan various 
projects, repayable in 20 
years. 
* Two sources give different figures on the amount of China's aid to Burma. 
TABLE 3 
China's Officially Announced Aid in 1980 
Recipient 
Kenya 
Zimbabwe 
Tanzania and 
Zambia 
Amount 
$50 million 
40 million rmb 
($26. 7 million) 
5.78 million pounds 
($12.83 million) 
Purpose/Comment 
Interest-free loan payable 
over 10-year period for 
rice growing and the de-
velopment of geothermal 
projects 
Interest-free loan for five 
years 
Loan for spare parts for 
Tan-Zam Railroad 
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Table 4 
China's Aid Recipients in 1979 by Region or Bloc 
Africa 
Benin 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Congo 
Equatorial Guinea 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Guinea 
Madagascar 
Malagasy Republic 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Niger 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Upper Volta 
Zaire 
Zambia 
North Africa and Middle East 
Egypt 
Morocco 
North Yemen 
South Yemen 
Syria 
Tunisia 
Communist Bloc 
Afghanistan* 
Yugoslavia 
Vietnam** 
Non-Communist Asia 
Burma 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Other 
Dominican Republic 
Fiji 
Jamaica 
Malta 
* China finished an aid project in Afghanistan after a communist government 
was installed there. 
** China claimed it gave food and medical assistance to Vietnamese in o·ccupied 
areas after China's invasion in early 1979. 
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TABLE 5 
China's Aid Recipients in 1980 by Region or Bloc 
Africa 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Congo 
Equatorial Guinea 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau 
Madagascar 
Malagasy Republic 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
North Africa and Middle East 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Morocco 
North Yemen 
South Yemen 
Communist Bloc 
North Korea 
Non-Communist Asia 
Bangladesh 
Burma 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Other 
Guyana 
Malta 
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TABLE 6 
Recipient 
Chinese Disaster or Emergency Aid in 1979 
Amount of Aid and Purpose 
Dominican Republic 10,000 rmb ($6, 700) to aid hurricane 
victims1 
Fiji 
Jamaica 
5,000 rmb ($3,300) to help cyclone 
victims2 
10,000 rmb ($6,700) to aid flood 
victims3 
Mauritius 20,000 rupees ($2,635) to help cyclone 
victims• 
Thailand 
Yugoslavia 
200,000 rmb ($133,000) to aid in re-
fugee reliefS 
300,000 rmb ($200,000) to aid earth-
quake victims6 
Sources: 1. NCNA September 13, 1979, cited in FBIS September 23, 1979, p. J-1. 2. 
NCNA April 10, 1979, cited in FBIS April 11, 1979 p. E-1. 3. NCNA June 
19, 1979, cited in FBIS June 20, 1979, p. J-3. 4. NCNA, April 5, 1979, cited 
in FBIS AprillO, 1979, p. 1-5. 5. NCNA, July 20, 1979, cited in FBIS, July 
27, 1979, p. E-9. 6. NCNA April 22, 1979, cited in FBIS April 24, 1979, p. 
H-1. 
Recipient 
Iran 
Mauritius 
Pakistan 
Somalia 
Thailand 
Thailand 
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TABLE 7 
China's Disaster or Emergency Aid in 1980 
Amount 
200,000 rmb1 
($133,000) 
10,000 rmb2 
($6,670) 
300,000 rmb3 
($200,000) 
300 tons of rice and 
other food• 
500,000 rmb5 
($333,000) 
500,000 rmb6 
($333,000) 
Purpose/Comments 
Given in blankets and 
tents to aid flood vic-
tims in north Iran 
To aid flood victims 
Food, blankets and 
medicine given to help 
Mghan refugees 
Given to help refugees 
200,000 rmb given in 
canned food and 
300,000 rmb in rice for 
Kampuchean refugees 
Same as above 
Sources: 1. NCNA, February 25, 1980, cited in FBIS, February 26, 1980, p. 11. 2. 
NCNA, January 19, 1980, cited in FBIS, January 23, 1980, p. Fl. 3. NCNA, 
February 18, 1980, cited in FBIS, February 20, 1980, p. Al. 4. NCNA, 
August 30, 1980, cited in FBIS, September 3, 1980, p. 11. 5. NCNA, August 
30, 1980, cited in FBIS August 30, 1980. 6~ NCNA, June 10, 1980, cited in 
FBIS, June 11, 1980, p. 13. 
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TABLE 8 
China's Aid to the United Nations and U.N. 
Affiliate Organizations in 1980 
Recipient Amount 
U.N. Common Fund $2 million1 
U.N. Conference on $1.17 million2 
Aiding Kampuchean 
People 
Food and Agricultural $100,0003 
Organization 
Food and Agricultural $300,000 
Organization 
Food and Agricultural $200,000 
Organization 
U.N. High Commis- $300,0004 
sioner on Refugees 
U.N. High Commis- $400,0005 
sioner on Refugees 
U.N. High Commis-
sioner on Refugees 
U.N. Interim Fund for 
Science and Tech-
nology 
U.N. Trust Fund for 
Namibia 
$300,0006 
$400,000 rmb7 
($267,000) 
$20,0008 
Purpose/Comments 
To help stabilize com-
modity prices 
Relief supplies for Kam-
puchean people 
To help famine stricken 
people in Africa 
To support Conference on 
Agrarian Reform and Ru-
ral Development 
To support seed improve-
ment 
To help Afghan refugees 
in Pakistan 
Follow-up on World Con-
ference on Agrarian Re-
form and Rural Develop-
ment 
Part to be paid in U.S. 
dollars 
In celebration of Interna-
tional Day for the Eli-
mination of Racial Discri-
mination 
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U.N. Trust Fund for $300,0009 
South Africa 
In celebration of Interna-
tional Day for the Eli-
mination of Racial Discri-
mination 
World Food Program $400,00010 
Sources: 1. NCNA, June 17, 1980, cited in FBIS, June 18, 1980, p. A5. 2. "Quarterly 
Chronicle and Documentation," The China Quarterly 83 1 1980): 631. 3. 
Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation" The China Quarterly 82 (1980): 
388. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. NCNA, March 20, 1980, cited in FBIS, 
March 21, 1980, p. Al. 9. "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," The 
China Quarterly 82 (1980): 388. 10. Ibid. 
TABLE 9 
China's Aid to Insurgency Groups or Revolutionary 
Movements During 1979 
Recipient 
Burmese Communist 
Party 
Khmer Rouge 
Laotian Rebel Forces 
Rhodesian guerrilla 
forces led by Robert 
Mugabe 
SWAPO 
Kind and/or Amount of Aid 
Medicine and supplies 
Large quantities of weapons, supplies, 
medicine, food and even advisors 
Military training, arms, supplies, 
salaries 
Arms and advisors 
Unknown quantity of military aid 
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TABLE 10 
China's Aid to Insurgency Groups or Revolutionary 
Movements During 1980 
Recipient Kind and/or Amount of Aid 
Burmese Communist 
Party 
Arms, equipments, training and 
medical supplies 
Khmer Rouge Large quantities of small arms, sup-
plies, equipment, medicine and prob-
ably food 
Rebel forces in Afgha-
nistan 
Small arms 
Rebel forces in Laos Military training, weapons and sup-
plies 
TABLE 11 
China's Aid to Non-communist Nations During 1979 
Burma 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
TABLE 12 
China's Aid To Non-communist Nations During 1980 
Bangladesh 
Burma 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
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TABLE 13 
China's Aid to African Nations During 1979 
Benin 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Congo 
Equatorial Guinea 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Guinea 
Madagascar 
Malagasy Republic 
Mali 
TABLE 14 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Niger 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Upper Volta 
Zaire 
Zambia 
China's Aid to African Nations During 1980 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Congo 
Equatorial Guinea 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissea 
Madagascar 
Malagasy Republic 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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TABLE 15 
China's Project Aid to African Countries in 1979 
(excluding agricultural projects) 
Recipient 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Congo 
Kind of Project 
Public works projects' 
Dam2 
Parliament buildin!f 
Hydropower station 
and transmission lines4 
Naval yard 
technicians5 
Equatorial Guinea Radio technicians6 
Communication 
project7 
Madagascar Hydroelectric stations 
Malagasy Republic Hydroelectric station9 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Niger 
Sierra Leone · 
Somalia 
Tanzania 
Upper Volta 
Dams'0 
Radio transmitter" 
Factory'2 
Hydroelectric plant'3 
Airport and 
terminal14 
building 
Reservoir project15 
Stadium'6 
Water project'7 
Coal survey's 
Stadium19 
Comments 
No other details 
Under construction 
Agreement signed 
Inaugurated: projects 
started in 1973 
Recently sent 
Recently sent 
Finished and handed 
over 
Talks held recently 
No details 
Protocal signed for 3 
dams 
For use by Foreign 
Ministry 
Under construction 
No details available 
Agreement signed 
Work in progress 
Just opened 
Completed; will be 
used by 30,000 people 
Found 50 million tons 
of coal 
Experts arrived to be-
gin construction 
Zaire 
Zambia 
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People's Palace20 
Farm implements, 
factory21 
Textile Mill22 
Work in progress 
Finished 
Foundation laid 
47 
Sources: 1. Manchester Guardian, February 25, 1979, p. 12. 2. NCNA, November 21, 
1979, cited in FBIS, December 7, 1979, p. 12. 3. AFP, December 15, 1979, 
cited in China Aktuell, December 1979, p. 10. 4. NCNA, December 28, 1979, 
cited in FBIS, July 17, 1979, p. 15. 5. NCNA, August 13, 1979, cited in China 
Aktuell, August 1979, p. 10. 6. NCNA, September 28, 1979, cited in China 
Aktuell, October 1979, p. 12. 8. NCNA, June 14, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, 
June 1979, p. 12. 9. Far Eastern Economic Review, September 28, 1979, p. 
34. 10. AFP, June 8, 1979, cited in FBIS, July 20, 1979, p. 11. 11. Ibid 12. 
Ibid. 13. NCNA, April10, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, April1979, p. 10. 14. 
NCNA, January 25, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979, p. 5. 15. 
NCNA, November 6, 1979, cited in China Akt!tell, November 1979, p. 11. 16. 
NCNA, April19, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, April1979, p. 10. 17. NCNA, 
July 25, 1979, cited in FBIS, July 26, 1979, p. 11. 18. NCNA, January 13, 
1979, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979, p. 5. 19. NCNA, March 6, 1979, 
cited in China Aktuell, March 1979, p. 7. 20. NCNA, January 18, 1979, cited 
in China Aktuell, January 1979, p. 5. 21. NCNA, July 24, 1979, June 1979, 
p. 12. 22. NCNA, January 14, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979, p. 
5. 
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TABLE 16 
China's Project Aid to African Countries in 1980 
(excluding agricultural projects) 
Recipient 
Benin 
Burundi 
Congo 
Kind of Project 
Sports complex' 
Highway2 
Boat building yard3 
Comments 
Under construction 
Ground breaking cere-
mony held 
Equipment and techni-
cians furnished 
Equitorial Guinea Tele-communications Handed over 
Madagascar 
Malagasy Republic 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
project4 
Bridges5 
Highway6 
Dam reconstruction 7 
Stadium8 
Work started 
Under construction 
Finished and turned 
over 
Started; will seat 
10,000 
Finished and handed 
over 
Well drilling project10 Protocol signed 
Cement plant" Started 
Dam12 Foundation ceremony 
held to be 31/2 year 
project to make use-
able 5,6000 hectares of 
land 
Office building'3 34 engineers and tech-
nicians sent 
Water conservation Under construction 
project'4 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
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Building to serve as Protocol signed 
headquarters for Re-
volutionary Party of 
Tanzania15 
Expansion of farm im-
plements factory16 
Road bridge17 
Handed over; raised 
capacity from 1,000 to 
3,700 tons 
Work in progress 
Sources: 1. NCNA, April 10, 1980, cited in FBIS April 14, 1980, p. 11. 2. NCNA, 
August 27, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, January 1980, p. 8. 4. NCNA, 
August 4, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, August 1980, p. 7. 5. NCNA, July 12, 
1980, cited in FBIS, July 23, 1980, p. E4. 7. NCNA, May 17, 1980, cited in 
China Aktuell, May 1980, p. 9. 8. NCNA, January 23, 1980, cited in China 
Aktuell, .January 1980, p. 8. 9. NCNA, June 1~, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, 
June 1980, p. 9. 10. NCNA, June 19, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, June 
1980, p. 9. 11. NCNA, July 24, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, July 1980, p. 9. 
12. NCNA, May 8, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, May 1980, p. 9. 13. 
Hangzhou Radio, October 6, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, October 1980, p. 9. 
14. NCNA, August 31, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, August 1980, p. 7. 15. 
NCNA, March 6, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, March 1980, p. 27. 16. NCNA, 
July 30, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, July 1980, p. 9. 17. NCNA, July 28, 
1980, cited in China Aktuell, July 1980, p. 7. 
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TABLE 17 
China's Agricultural Aid to African Nations in 1979 
Recipient 
Benin 
Madagascar 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Kind and/or Amount of Aid 
Agricultural team completed 
work' 
Experimental rice and 
vegetable 2 growing area 
turned over 
50 agricultural machines give, 
incl. 12 tractors and 4 
harvesters3 
Agricultural projected 
completed4 
Rice mill handed over5 
Agricultural projects handed 
over6 
Ground breaking ceremony for 
sugar milF 
Pumping station completed8 
Comment 
20 technicians 
also trained 
No further details 
Included wells, 
irrigation & wa-
ter conservation 
projects 
Capacity of 400 
tons 
Sources: 1. NCNA, September 25, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, September 1979, p. 
12. 2. NCNA, December 18, cited in China Aktuell, December 1979, p. 10. 3. 
Nouakchott Radio, March 19, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, March 1979, p. 7. 
5. NCNA, December 2, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, December 1979, p. 10. 6. 
NCNA, May 2, 1979 cited in China Aktuell, May 1979, p. 12; see also FBIS 
May 17, 1979, p. 14. 7. NCNA, March 2, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, March 
1979, p. 7. 8. NCNA, November 4, 1979 cited in China Aktuell, NovE:mber 
1979, p. 11. 
CHINA's FoREIGN Am IN 1979-80 51 
TABLE 18 
China's Agricultural Aid to Mrican Countries in 1980 
Recipient 
Benin 
Ghana 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Zaire 
-Kind and/or Amount of Aid 
Paddy rice project' 
Irrigation and rice cultivation 
projects2 
Field improvement project3 
Reclamation for paddy rice 
fields4 
Reservoirs and rice mills 
under construction5 
Agricultural technicians6 
Agricultural stations7 
Comment 
Finished and 
turned over 
Under construc-
tion 
Completed 
Completed 
Under construc-
tion 
On the job 
Covering 25,000 
hecters 
Sources: 1. NCNA, November 30, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, December 1980, p. 7. 
2. NCNA, February 10, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, February 1980, p. 7. 
5. NCNA, November 20, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, November 1980, p. 
8. 6. NCNA, July 30, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, July 1980, p. 11. 7. 
Zaire Press Agency, July 29, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, August 1980, p. 
7. 
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TABLE 19 
China's Medical Aid to African Countries in 1979 
Recipient 
Benin 
Congo 
Kind and/or Amount of Aid 
Medical team 1 
Comment 
Medicine and medical equip- Given free 
ment worth 37 million African 
Francs2 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Medical team3 
Gambia 
Guinea 
Medical team4 
Medical training program Mission com-
pleted 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Medical team6 
Medical team7 
Mauritania 
Morocco 
Sierra Leone 
Tanzania 
Health care center opened8 
Hospital turned over9 
Medical team 10 
Hospital 
polyclinic11 
turned into 
Agreement to sent 60 doctors12 
New medical team arrived13 
Togo Medical team14 
Zaire Medical team15 
Sources: 1. NCNA, December 26, 1979, cited in FBIS, December 27, 1979, p. 14. 2. 
NCNA, October 27, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, October 1979, p. 12. 3. 
NCNA, September 28, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, September 1979, p. 12. 
4. NCNA, October 30, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, October 1979, p. 12. 5. 
NCNA, August 11, 1979, cited in FBIS August 16, 1979, p. 12. 6. NCNA, 
October 26, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, October 1979, p. 12. 7. NCNA, 
November 10, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, November 1979, p. 11. 8. NCNA, 
January 5, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979, p. 5. 9. NCNA, 
December 11, 1979, p. 10. 10. NCNA, September 26, 1979, cited in FBIS, 
September 28, 1979, p. 11. 11. NCNA, January 13, 1979, cited in China 
Aktuell, January 1979, p. 5. 12. NCNA, January 13, 1979, cited in China 
Aktuell, January 1979, p. 5. 13. NCNA, March 22, 1979, cited in China 
Aktuell, March 1979, p. 7. 14. NCNA, May 11, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, 
May 1979, p. 12. 15. NCNA, November 26, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, 
November 1979, p. 11. 
CHINA's FoREIGN Am IN 1979-80 53 
TABLE 20 
China's Medical Aid to African Countries in 1980 
Recipient Kind and/or Amount of Aid Comment 
Algeria 202 medical personel sent1 Incl. medical 
research work 
Bostswana Medical team sent2 
Cameroon Medical team sent3 
Morocco Two medical teams sent4 
Niger Medical team sent5 
Sierra Leone Medical team sent6 
Somolia Medical team sent7 
Sudan Medical team sent8 
Sources: 1. Algiers Radio, July 9, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, July 1980, p. 8. 2. 
NCNA, June 11, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, June 1980, p. 9. 3. NCNA, 
January 31, 1980, cited in China Aktuell, January 1980, p. 8. 4. NCNA, 
June 9, 1980, cited in FBIS, June 18, 1980, p. A5. 5. NCNA, July 12, 
1980, cited in China Aktuell, July 1980, p. 8. 6. NCNA, May 10, 1980, 
cited in FBIS, May 13, 1980, p. E2. 7. NCNA, October 19, 1980, cited in 
China Aktuell, October 1980, p. 8. 8. NCNA, July 12, 1980, cited in China 
Aktuell, July 1980, p. 8. 
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TABLE 21 
China's Aid to Countries in Other Regions During 1979 
Dominican Republic 
Egypt 
Jamaica 
Malta 
Morocco 
North Yemen 
South Yemen 
Syria 
Tunisia 
TABLE 22 
China's Aid to Countries in Other Regions During 1980 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Guyana 
Iraq 
Malta 
Morocco 
North Yemen 
South Yemen 
Occasional Papers/Reprints Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies 
1977 Series 
No.1- 1977 
Chinese Attitude Toward Continental Shelf and Its Implication on 
Delimiting Seabed in Southeast Asia (Hungdah Chiu) 32 pp. 
No.2- 1977 
Income Distribution in the Process of Economic Growth of the 
Republic of China (Yuan-Li Wu) 45 pp. 
No.3- 1977 
The Indonesian Maoists: Doctrines and Perspectives (Justus M. van 
der Kroet) 31 pp. 
No.4- 1977 
Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study of Adaptation 
and Viability (Thomas J. Bellows) 22 pp. 
No.5- 1977 
Asian Political Scientists in North America: Professional and 
Ethnic Problems (Edited by Chun-tu Hsueh) 148 pp. Index 
No.6- 1977 
The Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreement of 1975: A Comparison 
with Other North Pacific Fisheries Agreements (Song Yook 
Hong) 80 pp. 
No. 7 - 1977** 
Foreign Trade Contracts Between West German Companies and the 
People's Republic of China: A Case Study (Robert Heuser) 22 
pp. 
No.8- 1977* 
Reflections on Crime end Punishment in China, With Appended 
Sentencing Documents (Randle Edwards, Translation of 
Documents by Randle Edwards and Hungdah Chiu) 67 pp. 
No.9- 1977 
Chinese Arts and Literature: A Survey of Recent Trends (Edited by 
Wai-lim Yip) 126 pp. 
No. 10- 1977 
Legal Aspects of U.S. Republic of China Trade and Investment -
Proceedings of A Regional Conference of the American Society of 
International Law (Edited by Hungdah Chiu and David 
Simon) 217 pp. Index 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 3.00 
$ 2.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 3.00 
$ 5.00 
Occasional Papers/Reprints Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies 
1977 Series 
No. 11- 1977 
Asian American Assembly Position Paper: I. A Review of U.S.-
China Relations 62 pp. 
No. 12- 1977 
Asian-American Assembly Position Paper: II. A Review of U.S. 
Employment Policy 24 pp. 
1978 Series 
No. 1 - 1978 (13) 
Indian Ocean Politics: An Asian-Mrican Perspective (K.P. 
Misra) 31 pp. 
No. 2 - 1978 (14) 
Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of China; 
Problems, Analysis, and Documents (Edited by Hungdah Chiu, 
with contribution by G. J. Sigur, Robert A. Scalapino, King C. 
Chen, Eugene A. Theroux, Michael Y.M. Kau, James C. Hsiung 
and James W. Morley). 207 pp. Index 
No. 3 - 1978 (15) 
Growth, Distribution, and Social Change: Essays on the Economy 
of the Republic of China (Edited by Yuan-li Wu and Kung-chia 
Y eh) 227 pp. Index 
No. 4 - 1978 (16) 
The Societal Objectives of Wealth, Growth, Stability, and Equity in 
Taiwan (Jan S. Prybyla) 31 pp. 
No. 5 - 1978 (17)* 
The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China as Reflecting 
Mao Tse-Tung's Influence (Shao-Chuan Leng) 18 pp. 
No. 6 - 1978 (18)-
Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some 
Yunnan Province Documents (Hungdah Chiu) 35 pp. 
No. 7 - 1978 (19) 
A Guide to the Study of Japanese Law (Lawrence W. Beer and 
Hidenori Tomatsu) 45 pp. 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 3.00 
$ 3.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
"$ 2.00 
Occasional Papers/Reprints Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies 
1978 Series 
No. 8 - 1978 (20) 
The Pueblo, EC-121, and Mayaguez Incidents: Some Continuities 
and Changes (Robert Simmons) 40 pp. 
No. 9 - 1978 (21) 
Two Korea's Unification Policy and Strategy (Yong Soon Yim) 82 
pp. Index 
1979 Series 
No. 1 - 1979 (22) 
Asian Immigrants and Their Status in the U.S. (Edited by Hungdah 
Chiu) 54 pp. 
No. 2 - 1979 (23) 
Social Disorder In Peking After The 1976 Earthquake Revealed By A 
Chinese Legal Document (By Hungdah Chiu) 20 pp. 
No. 3 - 1979 (24) 
The Dragon and the Eagle - A Study of U.S.-People's Republic of 
China Relations in Civil Air Transport (Jack C. Young) 65 pp. 
No. 4 - 1979 (25) 
Chinese Women Writers Today (Edited by Wai-lim Yip and William 
Tay) 108 pp. 
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